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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Second World War ended with a series of unresolved issues as a “victors’
justice.” With an estimated 78 million casualties, the Second World War was the
deadliest conflict in history. The estimated total of civilian casualties by “strategic
bombing, Nazi persecution, Japanese war crimes, population transfers in the Soviet
Union, Allied war crimes and deaths due to war related famine and disease was about 4052 million.1” Nearly two-thirds of the millions killed were civilians, and among them
were Asia’s “comfort women”, girls as young as eleven that the Japanese captured and
forced into sexual slavery. Women, subjected to intense torture, sexual abuse, and
humiliation by Japanese soldiers, were left to die in the conclusion of WWII. They were
abandoned to starve and die at the hands of the Allied forces with no way to return home
without a permit to travel through Japanese occupied territory. Due to the actions of the
Japanese and American government, almost half a century passed before the international
community acknowledged the existence of comfort women in 1991. During this time,
Japan rebuilt itself into arguably the most powerful country in Asia. With its increase in
power, Japan looked to assert its place in the international diplomatic community and set
its sights on attaining a seat on the UN Security Council.
With Japan’s attempts to increase its stature in the international community, the
Asian states that fell victim to Japan’s use of comfort women felt the need to step in and
expose the world to the crimes committed by Japan almost fifty years earlier. However,
Japan remains defiant and refuses to recognize its role in causing the suffering of
1

"World War II Casualties." Medical-Answers.org. Medical Answers, 2010. Web. 7 Feb. 2011.
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hundreds of thousands of women. Japan, with the support of the United States, is a strong
ally of the West and a prominent member in the diplomatic community. Exposure of such
crimes against humanity will irrevocably harm Japan’s reputation and will raise
questionable matters to the surface. Sensitive topics such as why the issue of comfort
women took half a century to reveal itself and Japan’s failure to take wartime
responsibility towards victim states will result in an international scrutiny. This would
hurt Japan in the diplomatic community while victim states like Korea fight for justice on
behalf of the forgotten comfort women. The combination of increased US influence as a
result of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 and Japan’s fervent nationalistic identity
served to widen the gap between Japan and other East and Southeast Asian nations,
making reconciliation over the issue of comfort women a problem that remains
unresolved to this day.
Current Critical Reviews
While the conclusion of WWII brought with it the end of Japanese Imperialism,
its effects remain and continue to adversely affect Japan’s relationship with neighboring
countries. The emergence of the comfort women controversy brought great scrutiny on
Japan, which affected Japan’s relationship with its diplomatic partners. As the
international community became more aware of comfort women through the advocacy of
both domestic and international groups, Japan felt increased pressure to take
responsibility for its crimes against Asian women.
Current news reflects the ongoing fight on the comfort women. A 2007 NY article
highlights the controversy surrounding the “Asia Women’s Funds” as an example of
Japan showing unrepentant behaviors. Until Japanese historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi
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uncovered incriminating documents in 1991, published by Japanese national daily
newspaper Asahi Simbun, which indicated the military’s direct involvement in running
the military brothels, Japan adamantly denied its culpability and consistently shirked
responsibility for the crimes it committed.2 In 1993, the Japanese government issued a
carefully-worded statement vaguely admitting their involvement in the military brothels,
yet rejecting legal responsibility for them by contending the brothels were neither a
“system” nor a crime against humanity. 3 Instead, Japan set up the “Asia Women’s Fund”
in 1995 to provide monetary compensation to each surviving comfort woman along with
a signed apology. While the Japanese intended the Asia Women’s Fund to aid in the
reconciliation process, it instead caused outrage from the Asian people. In Japan’s mind,
the AWF was a serious concession, especially given the fact postwar treaties absolved all
of Japan’s wartime crimes addressed as part of the Tokyo War Tribunal. By contrast,
former comfort women saw it as Japan attempting to silence the growing accusations
from groups advocating for the rights of comfort women and to save face in the
diplomatic community without taking full responsibility. The money provided as
compensation did not come directly from the Japanese government, but from the
conscientious ordinary citizens’ donations and contributions from several public servants.
In short, it is a private fund that does not represent the government clearly yet remains
under the control of the Japanese government.4

2

Soh, Sarah. "Japan's National/Asian Women's Fund for "Comfort Women"" Pacific Affairs 76.2 (2003):
209-33. JSTOR. Web. 3 Mar. 2011.
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"Washington Coalition Comfort Women Issues." Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues Inc.
Comfort-women.org, 2010. Web. 7 Feb. 2011.
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In the NY Times article, former Dutch comfort woman Ellen van der Ploeg stated
“If this were a pure government fund, I could have accepted it… Why should I accept
money from private Japanese people? They were also victims during the war.”5 As a
result, with the exception of 285 woman from South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippine who
received $17,000 each, most of the Asian states declined this monetary compensation. In
fact, many criticized those that did accept the compensation as they saw it as an act of
betrayal. In the mind of the international community at large, such compensation was
little more than “hush money.” Women’s advocacy groups believed that taking such
compensation undermined their efforts to obtain true justice for the victims and the
universal rights of women. Despite the lapse of judgment, continuous international
pressure from Asia and also from the United States fought to push Japan into taking a
more meaningful step in resolving the issue of comfort women.
After international awareness over the issue of comfort women became more
widespread in the 1990s, the United States urged Japan to formally accept responsibility
and apologize to the victimized Asian states. The United States Congress enacted a
number of resolutions to encourage the Japanese government to take responsibility for its
wartime actions. Resolution 126 (1997) urged Japanese government to issue a formal
apology and to pay reparations to all victims. Resolution 357 (2000) called the Japanese
government to issue an apology and pay reparation for their wartime crimes by their
military. A year after Resolution 357, Resolution 195 was issued to call upon the
Japanese government to formally issue an unambiguous apology in light of the history

5

NORIMITSU, ONISHI. "Japan’s ‘Atonement’ to Former Sex Slaves Stirs Anger." New York Times. The
New York Times, 25 Apr. 2007. Web. 5 Apr. 2011.

7

textbook controversy which angered the Asian community. When Japan failed to comply
in issuing a clear apology and to revise its textbook, Resolution 226 (2003) was
introduced to urge Japan to formally issue a clear and unambiguous apology for the
surviving former comfort women. Three years later, the Congress passed a a bipartisan
resolution, Resolution 759, for Japan to formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept
responsibility for its Imperial Armed Force’s coercion of young women into sexual
slavery.6 Resolution 121 (2007) was the final bill that was passed which encompassed all
the previous resolutions together. It called upon the Japanese government to formally
state a clear apology and accept historical responsibility for its Imperial Armed Force
involvement during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands.7
Japan made steps to amend past war aggressions through US resolutions and
international persistence. However, Resolution 121 has garnered a surprising response
from Japan. US Congressman Michael M. Honda introduced Resolution 121 in 2007,
riling Japanese conservatives. Mr. Honda has stated that “the purpose of this resolution is
not to bash or humiliate Japan,” but to urge the Japanese government to admit
wrongdoing to the dwindling survivors and help Japan to genuinely reflect on its
conduct.8 Japan, on the other hand, pursued an aggressive approach in an effort to prevent
the resolution from passing. While Mr. Honda intended for a historical reconciliation,
Japan took it as an offense that could be a negative impact on US-Japan alliance. To most

6

"Washington Coalition Comfort Women Issues." Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues Inc.
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conservatives, the resolution focuses excessively into the past and is considered
nonessential. As such, conservatives and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to comply
with the United States Congress demand for apology for the sexual slavery of foreign
women and seek to revise the 1993 statement. In a NY Times article, Mr. Honda stated as
a Japanese-American who was sent to an internment camp in Colorado, “it taught me that
if governments make mistakes, they should apologize.” In the end, ignorance of the past
is a blunder for future mistakes. Seeking reparations is a long process, but reconciliation
through government actions in the form of an apology is clear and absolute.9 Mr. Honda
asserts that “If we wanted to help Japan, it should be in the light of, ‘If you want to be a
global leader, you have to first gain the trust and confidence of your neighbors.”10
However, in 2007 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and conservative lawmakers
retracted Japan’s official position acknowledging the existence of comfort women but
denying government involvement. Instead, Mr. Abe took the position that due to the lack
of evidence on the subject, there was no reason for the Japanese government to claim
responsibility. As a result, Mr. Abe and his fellow conservatives refused to apologize to
the comfort women and lobbied against taking clearer responsibilities for the
enslavement of the victimized women in an attempt to rewrite Japanese history. Their
loss of a distinctive Japanese historical consciousness is expressed in their outrage toward
the war apology issued by Prime Minister Murayama.11 Mr. Abe criticized House

9

Honda, Michael M. "February 15, 2007 House Committee on International Relations, Protecting the
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10
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McCormack, Gavan. Client State: Japan in American Embrace. London: Verso, 2007. Print. 12

9

resolution 121, which blamed Japanese authorities for coercion as “objective fact and
does not consider the Japanese government’s measures so far.”12 In response to this
claim, outraged officials, particularly those from China and South Korea, and women’s
groups across the world took to the streets in violent protest. Fearful Japan being viewed
by the international community as unrepentant, Mr. Abe did concede that on some level
that there was coercion and acknowledged that the military played an indirect role in such
coercion, thus pulling back to ease diplomatic criticisms. China’s foreign minister Li
Zhaoxing urged Japan to accept responsibility and cooperate with China to resume an
amicable relation between the two.13 Within Japan, various groups slammed Mr. Abe’s
decision to change Japan’s stance on comfort women. In fact, a group of Japanese
researchers publically challenged his claims with presented evidences used which dates
back to Tokyo war tribunal which included evidence that Dutch investigators compiled
detailing the actions of Japanese soldiers and policemen who coerced young Indonesian
women to join military brothels.14 Japan’s main defense against accepting responsibilities
for their war crimes was their belief that the government was already tried for their WWII
crimes and formally accepted the ruling of the Tokyo War Tribunal as part of the 1951
San Francisco peace treaty. This belief put Japan in a difficult position; to refuse the
evidence would be to refuse the ruling, one which the government would have difficulty
in denying. In an effort to appease the conservatives and support Japanese statement

12

Fackler, Martin. "No Apology for Sex Slavery, Japan’s Prime Minister Says." Http://www.nytimes.com/.
The New York Times, 6 Mar. 2007. Web. 5 Apr. 2011.
13
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Apr. 2007. Web. 8 Feb. 2011.
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admitting Japan’s role in the military brothels, Mr. Abe vowed to ignore House
Resolution 121. In order for Japan to rectify past misdeeds with Asia, Japan must first
accept the need for reconciliation; the need to resolve the dispute over history textbook.
For much of the Cold War, Japan and Asia gave each other the cold shoulder until
a resolution was passed through the Diet and Prime Minister Murayama made a statement
of deep remorse over past colonial aggression towards the people of Asia. Later echoed
by following prime ministers, the “Murayama statement” was aimed at easing tensions
between Japan and Asia, explicitly to South Korea, yet failed to achieve the same within
the country. Many did not accept the Murayama statement and sought to revise it. Among
the groups, the “History Education” group, Tsukurukai (Association for New History
textbooks), was essential for the adoption of the historical revisionist movement in
history education .15 Various conservative groups oppose the war apology statement and
call for the return of traditional values. The textbook they call for downplay Japanese
atrocities and instill a sense of national pride in order to create a history that slowly, but
surely, return the Japanese identity to the semi-divine emperor system.16
Under the administration of Shinzo Abe, education officials said textbooks would
be cleansed of longtime references to the military. In 2001, several Japanese regional
school boards approved the use of a censored school textbook that concealed Japanese
crimes before and after WWII. The board of education endorsed the edited textbooks for
handicapped students which angered other Asian countries to the point that South Korea
suspended the cultural exchange plans in protest. In August, twenty men dressed in

15
16
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Korea’s national colors chopped off their little fingers in protest of the Japanese textbook
and mailed it to Japan.17 Public protest popped throughout North Korea and China over
the distortion of history. The Japanese government, however, refused both South Korea
and China’s demand to revise the heavily criticized textbooks which falsely narrate
Japanese military crimes during WWII18
However, the actions of the historical revisionist movement failed to reach the
people of Japan. The majority of Japanese school districts rejected the history textbooks;
accusing the textbook of whitewashing events such as the Nanjing massacre in China and
the sexual exploitation of Asian women by Japanese troops; summing Japanese
aggression as Japanese advancement in the book. Ayako Okino, a member of the
Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, have organized and lectured in over 1,000
meetings lobbying against the book. Ms. Okino stated ''it might be too much to say we
declare victory but this is a result stemming from campaigning by civic movements…We
must not use such a book for teaching children who carry the future on their shoulders.''19
Central government also approved the book for junior high school use, but received a
fervent response from both citizen and neighboring Asian states. In 2007, Japan’s
Education Ministry announced the reinstatement of Japanese military involvement in
mass Okinawan suicides when Okinawans publically protested the Imperial Army’s
major atrocity in Okinawa. Yet the Ministry of Education failed short in referring to these

17

Crampton, Thomas. "The Ongoing Battle over Japan's Textbooks." The New York Times - Breaking
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suicides as a result of military coercion and force until later on. When Prime Minister
Yasuo Fukuda succeeded the office, education officials replied that further
reconsideration will be put into revising the textbook; indicating for the first time that the
issue of the textbooks as a distortion of history has now become a political problem.20
The Okinawa revision did not clearly state direct military involvement in the textbook; it
is a start towards fixing the problem that will hopefully lead to future reconciliation
between Japan and Asia.
The story of the Japanese comfort women came under international scrutiny only
in the early 1990s when survivors of the comfort station stepped forward to speak about
their ordeal with the intention of forcing Japan to acknowledge their crimes against
humanity. Chapter one introduces the thesis of the paper, the controversy surrounding the
comfort women and its effect on Japan-Asia-US relationships, and investigates current
news articles that expose the issue of comfort women as a colonial legacy in the 21st
century. Chapter two presents a historical background on the formation of the comfort
women class and the failure of the Tokyo War Tribunal to allow the comfort women
cases to come to trial while also explaining cultural context that can explain the long
silence. Chapter three introduces the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal as a
means of examining the failure of the Tokyo War Tribunal and analyzes Japan-Asia-US
relationships following the Women’s Tribunal. Chapter four summarizes the paper and
provides future implications on comfort women and policy recommendations for
resolving comfort women issues for a future reconciliation between Japan and Asia.

20
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Chapter 2: The History of the Comfort Women and the Long Silence
The history of comfort women was erased from the dominant view of history
through “the homogenization and naturalization of knowledge about the past.”21 Comfort
women’s recollections not only shed light on the forgotten aspect of the Asia Pacific
War, but also challenged the common historical norms through evidence that support the
contention that Japanese government did have a hand in the implementation of comfort
stations.
Comfort women (ianfu in Japanese and wianbu in Korean) were generally young
Asian women forced into sexual slavery by the military to “serve” soldiers on the front
lines during World War II.22 They were the most vulnerable members of society due to
age, poverty, class, family status, education nationality, or ethnicity; they were generally
from poor and rural communities because the uneducated class were more easily
deceived into slavery.23 Japanese soldiers established comfort stations as military brothels
in the occupied colonial countries. The Imperial Conference, which consisted of the
emperor, representatives from the armed forces and the main Cabinet ministers approved
the establishment of comfort stations after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1937.24 From
1937 until the war ended in 1945, the Japanese forced an estimated 100,000 to 200,000
women, to deliver sexual services to Japanese soldiers. While most of the comfort

21

Fujitani, Takashi, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama. Perilous Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s).
Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2001. Print. 21.
22
Stetz, Margaret D., and Bonnie B. C. Oh. Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Print. 3
23
The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal: Judgment, 4 December 2001. The Hague: Women's
International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, 2002. Print. 73
24
Robinson, B.A. "Comfort Women Used as Sex Slaves during World War II." ReligiousTolerance.org by
the Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance. Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, 8 Nov. 2009.
Web. 05 Dec. 2010.

14

women were Korean, many hailed from other occupied territories such as China, Taiwan,
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Netherlands, Burma, Australia, and even Japan itself.
Ironically, the first comfort women were Japanese until the military elites saw the need to
acquire more women to satisfy the vast Japanese military. As a result, they attempted to
“recruit” additional women in occupied countries. Korean women became the preferred
candidates for comfort women and were specifically reserved for officers because they
were considered clean. As a result, Korean women became targets of the Japanese
military.25
The Mobilization of Comfort Women for War
The Japanese created the first military comfort stations in the early 1930s when
Japan sent soldiers to cope with the Shanghai Uprising in China. The first comfort station
that was established in Shanghai was constructed by the navy.26 The main purpose of
these stations was to encourage the fighting spirits of the soldiers and keep morale high
as the war progressed by means of “comforting” the men sexually. In addition, they were
meant to prevent the spread of venereal diseases by providing alternatives to traditional
brothels. Given the widespread prevalence of venereal disease among Japanese soldiers,
the military tried to contain them by ordering them to use military stations exclusively.
The military provided condoms, regular check-ups, sanitary and hygiene rules, and other
regulations for the comfort women. However, the most direct reason for the expanding
military comfort stations was the frequent rape of women carried out by Japanese soldiers
during the war. As soldiers destroyed towns, raped women, burned houses and brutally

25

Howard, Keith. True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women: Testimonies. London: Cassell, 1995. Print.
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murdered any captives in the most inhumane ways, they created an intense anti-Japanese
sentiment among locals that made it difficult to maintain order in the occupied territories.
Hence, the “comfort station system institutionalized sexual violence against comfort
women in an attempt to curb unauthorized sexual violence (Yoshimi, 9).” Finally, the
military saw the comfort station system as a potential source of revenue, as they charged
soldiers fees to use the comfort station. As the war dragged on and Japan became more
involved in the war, the demand for comfort women continued to grow.27
The Japanese government refuses to acknowledge the comfort stations as a result
of a lack of evidence which directly indicate Japanese government involvement. One
matter of controversy between Korean and Japanese authorities today is the recruitment
methods, but newly discovered evidence such as mobilization records and travel passes
attest to the fact that the comfort stations were systematically organized by the military.
The methods used to draft Asian women strongly indicate Japanese military’s active role
in the process. Research indicates that there were four primary methods of recruitment:
“recruitment by violence, including threats of violence and the misuse of power; false
promises of employment; abduction; human traffic.”28

27
28
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Table 1. A table by former Korean comfort women on how comfort women were drafted by the Japanese
military.

Recruitment
method
Violence
False
employment
Abduction
Human traffic
Other

Civilians
0
6

Recruited by
Local authority
Military/military
police
0
3
2
1

1
1
0

0
0
0

Civilian
employees
1
4

1
0
1

0
0
0

Source: Howard, Keith. True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women: Testimonies. London: Cassell, 1995.
Table 4.

Soldiers and military police were the main perpetrators of violent recruitment.
Civilian perpetrators, occasionally village authoritative figures, used false promises of
employment in Japan and were the most common method in the recruitment of women.
Civilians usually were the main perpetrators that carried the last two methods, abduction
and human trafficking. The village heads might inform the Japanese soldiers of the
families who had daughters and forcibly took removed them from their homes,
Sometimes even with the assistance of soldiers.29 Despite the role of civilians as
recruiters, evidence indicates that the:
Military controlled and intervened by providing transport such as boats or trucks,
or by raping the women during transit. A military document dated 4 March 1938
actually records that ‘personnel in charge of drafting women must be selected
with great care to minimize commotion during the process,’ thus implying that
civilians could be appointed or licensed by the military to recruit women.30
Current primary documents expose the army central command and the state
involvement in the drafting of the comfort women. Names of the commissioned officers

29
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Byun, Young-Joo. The Murmuring II- Habitual Sadness. Seoul: Korean Film Council, 2005. Video.
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that were involved in the establishment of the military brothels have surfaced to reveal
that most of the officers were members of the army elite. Army elites such as Okamura
Yasuji, Commander of the China Expeditionary Force in 1944, were one of few who
were publically named for his involvement with the comfort stations. These documents
reveal that the establishment of comfort stations is a systematic operation that is approved
and promoted by the Ministry of War itself.31
One key document found that attest to the Ministry of War involvement was
discovered to show incriminating evidence of higher authority involvement. A notice,
issued by an adjutant in the Ministry of War labeled “Matters Concerning the
Recruitment of Women to Work in Military Comfort Stations,” clearly stated the
government’s role in the comfort station:
In recruiting women domestically to work in the military comfort stations to be
set up in the areas affected by the China Incident…it is feared that some people
have claimed to be acting with the military’s consent and have damaged the honor
of the army, inviting the misunderstanding of the general public…In the future,
armies in the field will control the recruiting of women and will use scrupulous
are in selecting people to carry out this task. This task will be performed in close
cooperation with the military police or local police force of the area. You are
hereby notified of the order [of the Minister of War] to carry out this task with the

31
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utmost regard for preserving the honor of the army and for avoiding social
problems.32
This document clearly states that the Ministry of War was involved in procuring
comfort women in order to avoid social problems from the local citizens. The phrase
“You are hereby notified of the order [of the Minster of War]” can attest to the fact that it
was an authorization from the War Minister, Sugiyama Hajime himself. Since the War
Minister in charge with the military government is involved, the issue of comfort women
can be traced back through the line of command which leads all the way up to the
emperor himself.
The extent of the Japanese government’s role in establishing and maintaining
comfort stations extends all the way to Emperor Hirohito. Hirohito, along with the
members of the Imperial Conference, was aware of the existence and activities that
transpired within comfort stations. He was the Head of State of Japan and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces and wielded political powers that were independent and
superseded the authority of the Japanese government. The Ministry of War may have
been in charge of the military government, but he was not given supreme authority of
command and wielded a partial authority that was accountable to the emperor. As a
result, the Prime Minister, Ministry of War, Home Ministry, and other cabinet members
had the responsibility to inform the emperor of domestic and international affairs. More
importantly, enormous power was granted to Hirohito by the Constitution. In 1882, a
formal decree was issued that explicitly declared all ultimate decision-making power,
such as the power to declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties, lay solely in the
32

Yoshimi, Yoshiaki, ed., Jugun Ianfu Shiryoshu. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1992. 105-104
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Emperor.33 Even if Hirohito was merely a figurehead and his counsel kept requisite
knowledge away from him, international media and public outcry would make it nearly
impossible for the Emperor to remain ignorant. His own brother, Prince Mikasa, stated
that Hirohito was well aware of the atrocities committed by his soldiers and even
discussed the issue with him publically.34 In conclusion, it would be facetious to assume
that Hirohito was not informed of the comfort stations, and as Head of State of Japan and
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, it was his responsibility to approve the
establishment and maintenance of comfort stations under the guise of his political
advisors, thus implicating Hirohito in the atrocities committed by the Japanese during the
war, including those associated with comfort women.35 As the country’s ruler, the
emperor must be recognized as the guiltiest one of all. However, these crimes against
humanity were not tried due to Allied forces interventions.
Chapter 3: Tokyo War Tribunal
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the
Tokyo War Tribunal, was intended to deliver a just trial and punishment of the major war
criminals, but instead turned into a trial where the victors become the lawmakers. In
reality, the Tokyo War Tribunal was nothing more than an American show trial with the
intention of turning Japan into a client state. Established on January 19, 1946, eleven
Allied Powers (The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, China,
Philippines, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, India, and New Zealand) charged twentyeight high-ranking war criminals with “A Class crimes” (crimes against peace)

33
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committed in Asia between 1928 and 1945. The trial, organized and led by the United
States, lasted until November 4, 1948 when tribunal president sir William Webb found all
defendants guilty. Of the twenty-eight criminals charged, seven were sentenced to death,
sixteen to life imprisonment, one to a seven years term, another to a twenty years term,
two deceased during trial, and one declared insane.36
The Tokyo War Tribunal was a failure in many ways, and the repercussions of the
tribunal affect Asian politics to this day. First and foremost, critics charged that the
tribunal failed to hold the man who bore the greatest responsibility for Japan’s crimes
accountable: Emperor Hirohito. In examining the facts available, it becomes clear that
there are only two reasons why the Allied powers did not bring Hirohito to trial at the
Tokyo War Tribunal. Firstly, even before the United States dropped atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese government understood that defeat was inevitable,
but refused to yield because it would mean the complete surrender and indictment of their
emperor.37 The Japanese government frantically tried to find a way that they could
surrender but still obtain a full pardon for the Emperor and the imperial family. The
defense lawyers at the Tokyo Tribunal sought to protect the Emperor who represented the
essence of Japan. Secondly, the prosecution did not put Hirohito on trial for fear that it
would lead the Japanese people to riot.38 Given such considerations, the Allies never even
put Hirohito on trial. Hirohito went on to live the rest of his life under the protection of

36
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his advisors and later, by the United States.39 While other Allied nations wanted to bring
Hirohito to trial, General Douglas MacArthur convinced both the Allied nations and the
US Congress that communism was the new threat and that they needed a strong ally in
Asia to fight against the communist Soviet Union and China. MacArthur knew that
Hirohito was the key to ensuring stability within Japan and the fastest solution to fight
against communism in Asia. If the US dethroned Hirohito, it is a possibility that the
Japanese would have fought to restore him to his throne. The very lives of the people are
integrated with the emperor as the center. Thus, it was the political considerations of the
US and the strong conviction of Hirohito’s subordinates that rescued him from an
indictment during the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.
Second, most of the cases tried during the tribunal were reopened for examination
in 1950 when large number of Japanese criminals still remained in prison throughout
Asia. The Japanese people united and demanded reduced sentences for Japanese
criminals. In the Japanese point of view, the tribunal was unfair and the prisoners were
victims of war. Ironically, the aftermath of the atomic bomb fostered a victim mentality
within the Japanese populace. The result of an unforgotten catastrophic event altered the
politics of remembering to the point that it has become skewed to suit the need of the
people. Japan believed that their criminals were victims of war, not murderers who have
committed heinous crimes during the WWII. Once all convicted war criminals were
released, fourteen Class-A war criminals were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine
which became a major cause for a political dispute. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro
and Abe Shinzo’s public homage to the shrine displays a blatant disregard to all of
39
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Japan’s Asian neighbors. It is also disrespect to the former emperor who requested
homage to the shrine be stopped in consideration for Japan’s neighbors. As a result,
Allied courts agreed to reexamine cases and managed to reduce sentences for some of the
criminals and even received parole for others. Later, MacArthur showed support for the
reopening of the cases and issued a sentence reduction by one-third for good behavior
and parole for those sentenced to life imprisonment after serving fifteen years.40 This
effectively downplayed the crimes against humanity originally punished at the Tokyo
War Crimes Tribunal and enabled the Japanese people to integrate memories of atomic
victimization with the memories of the victims of their own aggressions. This lack of
remorse and responsibility infuriates the victimized Asian to this day, as they naturally
expected the tribunal to be a means to punish Japan for its crimes against peace,
conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Instead, the victimized Asian
nations saw the tribunal as little more than a tool used by the US for political expediency
with Japan’s embrace of the US being tantamount to a slap in the face.
Finally, American dominated the tribunal. For example, General MacArthur both
headed and organized the tribunal and director of the criminal division of the US
Department of Justice, Joseph Keenan, served as the chief prosecutor. In addition,
Americans composed and General MacArthur approved the rules governing the trial
(referred to as the Tokyo Charter). More importantly, however, the official language used
in trial was English and only one out of the eleven judges, Justice Radhabinod Pal, was
familiar with international law. As a result, the remaining judges could not understand
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the proceedings and saw the trial being heavily slanted in the US’s favor. In addition, all
the committee representatives were citizens of the victor states and some were even direct
victims of Japanese aggression during WWII. As such, the idea that the Tokyo War
Tribunal was fair and impartial is a complete farce.
In spite of all the criminals tried during the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the
United States silenced comfort women and did not address their issue at all during the
tribunal. In fact, the Dutch military tribunal in Indonesia was the only trial that
prosecuted the Japanese for sexual slavery. Drawn to Indonesia’s vast oil resources,
Japanese forces took control of Indonesia and began their three-and-a-half-year-long
occupation by raping Dutch women living in Indonesia.41 The reason why the comfort
women of Indonesia received justice while those from other Asian nations did not was
simply due to the fact that those affected by the Japanese crimes were citizens of the
country leading the tribunal. In a particularly incriminating piece of testimony, a former
Dutch woman stated:
On Saturday afternoon, 7 March 1942, the Japanese soldiers had appeared in the
emergency hospital where the women and children were seated together. The
ladies were here raped by the Japanese…After this happened, we managed to tell
the Chinese doctor Liem. He went to the commandant…we were transferred to a
classroom in a school nearby…Between ten and twelve o’clock that night…a
whole mass of Japanese soldiers entered with the above mentioned Commandant
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at the head. The Commandant sat o a table in our classroom and then watched
how each of the women was dragged away, one by one, to be raped.42
This testimony highlights the collaboration between Japanese soldiers and
civilians to target Allied women, and Indonesian women, through force and deceptive
means. As mentioned previously, civilian perpetrators were common participants in
crimes committed by the Japanese. While the commandant did not engage in sexual
violence against the women, he did deceptively lead the women into false safety and
brought Japanese soldiers during the dead of night to brutally rape them amidst the
screams and cries. Given the palpability of such crimes committed against their own
people, Dutch military forces in Batavia investigated and tried twelve Japanese soldiers
in 1948. In response to these crimes, General Nozaki Seiji, head of the Cadet School,
made the following statement to the Dutch military prosecutors:
I must admit that such an undesirable situation arose as the result of me neglecting
my own duty to properly supervise junior officers. When I received an order to
close down the “comfort stations” I was truly ashamed of myself. I went to see the
commander of the Southern Army and sincerely apologized for bringing disgrace
on the Army Cadet School.43
Despite being sentenced to twelve years imprisonment, the only remorse shown
laid in the fact the existence of the comfort stations under his watch damaged the army’s
reputation rather than any remorse for the Dutch women that the Japanese victimized.
This lack of concern is reflected not only by the Japanese, but by Dutch military
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authorities as well. While Dutch officials interrogated a wide range of former comfort
women, they collected relevant information to solve the cases of the white Dutch victims
only, while they dismissed the vital testimony of Indonesia women. Given such fact, it
becomes apparent that the Dutch did not concern themselves with the exploitation of
indigenous women. Due to racial discrimination against indigenous, non-white women,
the Tokyo Tribunal not only failed to try those responsible for crimes against humanity
involving Asian, but deliberately concealed ample evidences that jeopardized Japan44
The Asian comfort women
There are many ways to explain in depth why such tribunals never mentioned
Asian comfort women, but the predominant factor that led to this silence was racial
discrimination by Allied forces. Immediately following the end of the Second World
War, Allied forces held a deep seeded resentment and hatred towards Asians, especially
towards the Japanese. Both sides heavily utilized propagandas to dehumanize the other in
an attempt to improve morale among soldiers and foster hatred towards the enemy.
Furthermore, atrocities committed by both sides only served to fuel this animosity. The
Japanese raped and killed with an unholy passion. The Americans brutally killed the
Japanese and took fingers for souvenirs. This type of aggression instills a deep hatred
where discrimination is a blinding factor and such racism manifested itself prominently in
dealing with the issue of comfort women.
The Allied powers emerged victorious in the Second World War. As a result, the
Allied nations earned the right to choose the perfect conclusion. In examining its
proceedings and its verdicts, the IMTFE can be easily characterized as “victor’s justice.”
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In doing so, the allies exacted their revenge for all the suffering they endured at the hands
of the Japanese without considering losses that did not directly affect them. As such, it
was in the Dutch’s best interests to try the Japanese soldiers responsible for the comfort
stations in Indonesia given the fact that such were offenses against the people of the
nation that was holding the tribunal. Given a nation’s responsibility to protect its people,
it is understandable that the Dutch would want to protect its people’s human rights. At the
same time, however, it also reflects the prejudice in existence among Allied nations and
the mentality that if it did not affect one’s own people, then it is not one’s concern. In the
end, the IMTFE simply emphasized the victor’s right to pick and choose what crimes it
cared about, rather than seeking justice for all those affected.45
In the end, the fact remains that the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was meant to
focus on the interests of the United States rather than the interests of East Asian nations
and their people. Given that the United States provides the funds and staff necessary to
hold the tribunal and that the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the South Pacific,
General Douglas MacArthur presided over the whole trial. It would be foolish to think
that the IMTFE was not biased in favor of the Americans. With the Japanese government
conceding to the jurisdiction of the IMTFE, as signed in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
Japan accepted the judgment of the IMTFE and agreed to carry out the sentence as stated
in Article 11. Under Article 14, it stated that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied
Powers for the damage and suffering caused during WWII, but because of its inability to
pay for all the damage it caused, Japan entered negotiations to obtain assistance in paying
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the compensation and the Allies waived of all reparations claim by the Allied Powers
except the ones provided in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.46 Japan’s only obligations
were to the Allied Powers as stated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. At the same time,
the Japanese had little obligation to deal with legal issues that the tribunal did not
address, like that of comfort women. The Japanese viewed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty as insurance against external pressures. While blame for the failure to address the
crimes against humanity involving Asian comfort women lay with the United States and
other Allied Powers, blame for failure to take responsibility and make amends to East
Asia rests solely in Japan.
In the eyes of the United States, ignoring the issue of Asian comfort women was
necessary because it saw dealing with the threat of communism to be more important
than holding the Japanese accountable for war crimes they committed. The subsequent
occupation of Japan brought with it changes that dismantled key elements of Japanese
feudal society in order to push Japan into the democratic age. In doing so, Americans
brought many significant social, economic, and political reforms in order to prevent the
reemergence of militarism, and against the rise of communism. During the post-WWII
era, the United States adopted a national security policy promoting containment, and as
part of this policy, US Officials attempted to create a policy that focused on two main
objectives: maintaining world balance of power and protecting the United States against
potential threats, especially those involving communism. As a result, the United States
sought to avoid complications with comfort women and sidestepped the issue. The
United States needed a strong ally in Asia, especially given China’s rise as a communist
46
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nation. Japan became that ally and the US shifted its focus towards economic growth and
to ensure stability, and to do so necessitated, the continuity of certain prewar practices
and marginalization of certain aspects of its history, like that of comfort women. Given
such facts, US actions regarding the status of comfort women may have been justified.
Had the US not overlooked the issue of comfort women, it could have potentially
compromised the US’s efforts to build a strong, stable relationship with Japan, which
meant possibly losing an important ally in its fight against communism. The new
constitution "retained the imperial system but also established the principle of popular
sovereignty and guaranteed a broad range of human rights."47 Under Article 9 of the new
constitution, the military was dissolved and Japan renounced its sovereign right to wage
war. The Emperor remained the symbolic head of state and ensured stability, but also
guaranteed that he remained a puppet of the United States. As for the Diet, it remained
functional, but democracy introduced popular election and implemented many reforms
such as women rights. However, democracy in Japan was very limited. MacArthur
exercised absolute power and practiced widespread censorship that made it clear that
democratic freedom was not yet possible. He encouraged the “continued socialization in
the acceptance of authority” to a society that is subservient to the political head in order
to exert his power over the people.48 It did remain effective in containing communist
sentiments from spreading within Japan. Later on, the US implemented a “Reverse
Course” reforms to strengthen the Japanese economy to fortify itself against
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Communism. It is clear that Japan gained more from the US occupation than any Asian
country post-WWII.49
During the post-WWII era, the United States adopted a national security policies
promoting containment. US Officials attempted to create a policy that focused on two
main objectives: maintaining world balance of power and protecting the United States
against potential threats. As a result, the United States sought to avoid complications with
the comfort women and sidestepped the issue. The United States needed a strong ally in
the US since China cannot step up as the Asian leader. Japan became that ally and all
focus was shifted towards economic growth and to ensure stability. In the context of the
global community post-WWII, US actions may have been justified in that US could not
pursue stability in Japan had they not overlooked the comfort women which might
compromise Japan’s position as a US ally in the fight against communism.
Cultural Influence
More than half a decade already passed before the international community
learned of the existence of comfort women. The war atrocities committed by Japanese
soldiers were indeed appalling. When the crimes came to light almost fifty years later,
many of the victims were in no condition to speak out against the atrocities committed
against them. In order to explain why they did not speak up earlier, it is important to
understand the mindset of both the Japanese and Asia. Focus will shift towards Korean
societies as the country that was brutally exploited by the Japanese and following recent
revelations that between eighty and ninety percent of comfort women were Korean;
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making it a Korean tragedy. Such cultural analysis must be taken into account because
these cultural elements ultimately provide clues as to why the world chose to ignore the
issue of comfort women in the years immediately following the Second World War. By
observing the culture that is instilled in the populace, one can come to realize what
caused such silence, not only the government, but from the victims themselves.
Communication is unique within every Asian culture, yet there are certain
nuances that are consistent across every Asian culture. In East Asia, China played a
dominant role in influencing culture, with the Chinese exchanging written language,
religion, and philosophy amongst other East Asian ethnic groups, particularly with the
Japanese and Koreans. When looking at basic philosophy, the tenets of Chinese
Confucianism played a key role in the development of Japanese and Korean society. In
addition, relationships and personal ties play a key role in the societies of most East
Asian countries. For example, Japanese have a clear understanding in distinguishing
between insiders (family, friends) and outsiders (acquaintances) and to strive to keep wa
(“harmony”) within their groups. “Wa” is something that “is desired or aimed for” in
Japanese groups.50 A second key Japanese concept is that of dependence (Amae). Amae
means “to depend and presume upon another’s benevolence” which is “a thread that runs
through all of the various activities in Japanese society.”51 It is a deep sense of
dependence that is manifested in not only familial relationships, but also translates to
other relationships. A final key Japanese concept is enryo (“to restrain oneself”). It is a
notion where society conforms under group pressure because there is a constant
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conscious awareness among individuals to not go against a majority as a consideration
towards others. Words are carefully chosen in consideration of the other in hopes of
avoiding possible embarrassment. For a woman to speak out against her family wishes
would result in the break of wa and the embarrassment of the family. These three
concepts form a Japanese collectivism where the group takes precedence over individual
needs because Japanese define their well-being and success through the achievements of
the group.52
The same concepts apply in Korea. Koreans also refer to themselves, not as an
individual, but as an part of a group called woori (“we”); woori is a closed group that
consists mainly of family members that are bound together by cheong (“affection”) and
nichi (“dependence”).53 As such, there is a strong sense of nationalism and filial piety
which is instilled within the in-groups as a result of a strong obligation to one’s family
and cultural pride. Koreans also establish the importance of noonchi (“other awareness,
or situation sensitivity”) in communication.54 However, unlike the Japanese concept of
enryo, where one speaks in consideration of the other, noonchi is related to
“communication incompetence.” If the speaker does not choose to express themselves in
a clear manner, then it is assumed that the speaker does not presume the other will
understand the meaning of his words. Noonchi is used to figure out the intention of the
other without concrete details by playing with different words filled with deep meanings
and one’s knowledge of the other. This manner of communication is primarily used by
the educated class and the elites. To not be able to use noonchi is seen as a sign of one’s
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lack of ability.55 Educated or not, Koreans value loyalty, filial piety, and in-group
obligations which forms the Korean collectivism. Cultural influences impact
communication in one’s culture and collectivistic norms and rules are the main cultural
trend in Asian cultures.56
As a result of collectivist norms and rules, patriarchy is one of the main
components of Japanese and Korean cultures, which is a key reason why society
demanded women bear their pain in silence. In a society where loyalty, filial piety, and
family obligations are a large part of one’s cultural norms, patriarchy is a common social
structure and system where a male dominates and exploits the female population.57 In
such a culture, the father occupies the top of the family hierarchy and the rights and
benefits of the rest of the family members are second to his. In Japan, the Meiji
government institutionalized the patrilineal stem family system in 1868 in order to
“create a centralized nation-state.”58 Consequently, the eldest son had exclusive right of
inheritance as the heir of the family. In addition, upon marriage, the wife took on the role
of housekeeper and caretaker for her aging father and mother-in-law. The system also
forced any additional sons, who did not have any claim to family inheritance, to establish
a separate family and pursue their own career and family e while the eldest son’s
remained in his parents’ house.59 As a result of the system, eventually, the family became
a group where family members placed emphasis on the eldest son’s obligation of
continuing the family name with all the implied rights and duties that came along with it.
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By the outbreak of the Second World War, the patrilineal stem family system was the
norm in Japanese society. In a society where men were the patriarchs and the religious
societal influences of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Samurai culture stressed dominance
over women, women were in all ways inferior to men and allowed men virtual free reign
to ruthlessly exploit women.60
For the most part, Korea followed the same patriarchical system as Japan. The
patrilineal stem families in Korea required the eldest son to remain home and bring a wife
into the household, which ensured a comfortable source of income and domestic labor for
the care of his aging parents.61 Since the majority of Koreans maintained a rural lifestyle,
the household served as the primary economic unit that sustained a peasant’s lifestyle.
Under this system, each household is organized around the father and exists as a closed
group that uniquely separates its members from those of another household. The
household carries a line of succession in which the household roles can be passed down
from one person to another following the senior male line.62 This pattern of succession
instilled a sense of filial piety within the children to their parents who gave birth to them
and raised them. In gratitude, the children felt obligated to care for their aging parents
and continue the family line.63 The patrilineal rule of descent led to the creation of unique
kin groups and clans that are generally maintained and registered in their genealogical
records.
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These genealogical records, or the lineage book, hold the records of all the group
members born and accepted into the household which is proof of their history. The
responsibility of becoming the bookkeeper of the record belongs to the head.64
In a society where survival depends on labor power, sons are considered more
ideal due to the fact that men bring a wife into his household and have children, which
will expand their source of capital. By contrast, a daughter will marry out of her
household and is no longer considered a member of her father’s family. As a
consequence, women’s roles are generally confined to the house and do not participate in
society in the same capacity as men do. At a young age, girls are taught the virtues of
subordination and endurance in order to prepare themselves for future roles as wife and
mother. This tradition of total female subjugation led to a harsh, lonely life for most
women who from a young age are forced to submit to men until they enter her husband’s
family to serve as the lowest member in the family until she bears a son. The outcome of
such psychological trauma ultimately brainwashed the woman in Korean society into
believing that a son is equivalent to happiness in their society. Given their place in a
male-dominated society, Asian women maintained a lesser stature that allowed the
Japanese to get away with the crimes they committed until the 1990s.65
The Asian patriarchal culture is a major reason that led to the silence of former
comfort women. In a society where the rules condone the oppression of women by the
male population, former comfort women had little chance to obtain justice. At that time,
there was little widespread understanding of human rights, particularly within both Japan
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and Korea’s governments. The majority of the women refused to tell their family the
truth of the shame it would bring, while the local communities immediately ostracized
those who did. As stated earlier, both countries relied on well defined familial groups
within small, close knit communities. Society forbade women to speak out publicly as it
could be seen as infringing on the men’s dominant role in society. At the same time,
Korean men chose to not speak out due to the shame associated with their inability to
save their women. As mentioned previously, society saw women as a man’s property. In
a man’s mind, to be unable to protect what he viewed as his property was a failure on his
part and shameful to his family, name, and culture. In addition, poverty besieged colonial
Korea, which meant that possible work offers held strong attraction to both family and
women. To these women, such an opportunity was a chance of a lifetime, one they would
willingly take despite the traditional view of women. The reality of the situation, of
course, was a nightmare and led to shame being brought on her entire family. More
importantly, men and women being equalized could be seen as Korea being feminized by
Japanese male dominance. In light of such realization, it can be understood that after so
many losses, the people chose to ignore their pains and shame in order to rebuild their
country. For a period of time, this maneuver proved to be successful in light of pressing
state matters post-WWII. The truth about comfort women was never revealed and was
lost until one aging woman shared her tales as a comfort woman to the world.
Chapter 4: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal
It is largely the Korean women’s movement that launched the international effort
to obtain awareness and compensation for the remaining comfort women. The Japanese
made no reparations to any former Asian comfort women post-WWII. Most likely, the
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truth would have remained buried if not for Japan’s ambition to seek a higher status in the
international community, which reignited fear throughout Asia of a renewed Japanese
empire. As a last defense, countries victimized by the issue of comfort women brought
the issue to the forefront of the international debate as a means to put international
pressure on Japan to atone for its crimes. While the South Korean government claimed
that documentary evidence was destroyed after Japan’s defeat, however during Roh, TaeWoo’s presidency (1988-1994), several key factors emerged to address the Japanese
crimes against comfort women. First, the development of a women’s movement began to
emerge and pushed for an investigation into the existence of comfort women. Lee, TaiYoung was the first female lawyer in Korea who successfully revised the family law
regarding women’s rights. In addition, as Korea became more economically stable,
Koreans began to investigate and accuse Japan for their imperialistic actions. Finally,
former comfort women came to a key realization after remaining silent for half a decade:
they saw that as they began to die, the details of the crimes committed against them
would die as well.66 As a result, surviving former comfort women began to come forward
in order to share their stories with the world.
As the political climate changed in the 1990s, international awareness grew as a
response to growing testimonies and media on former comfort women; ultimately leading
to the creation of international organizations with the sole purpose of addressing Japanese
crimes against humanity. Pae Ponggi is considered the first Korean comfort woman to
break the silence after appearing in a Korean documentary in 1979. However, Kim HakSun was the first to appear in a public press conference at the headquarters of the Korean
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Women's Association United on August 14, 1991. The Korean Women`s Associations
United, created on February 18, 1987, worked to unite women`s organizations working
for women`s rights and democracy. With the public support from the KWAU, Kim HakSun recalled the painful memories of being forced into sexual servitude in front of a
crowd of reporters. As a result, Kim Hak-Sun became a symbol of courage and hope for
other former comfort women. In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two South Korean
comfort women confronted Tokyo District Court and sued the Japanese Imperial Forces
along with thirty-five Koreans. The combination of Kim Hak-Sun’s public appearance
and the class-action law suit caught the attention of both Japan and the world, causing
them to become completely focused on Korea and opened the gateway for international
movements to publicize the plight of comfort women.
Korean former comfort women held their first protest rally in front of the
Japanese Embassy in Seoul on Wednesday, January 8, 1992 and continue to protest to
this day, thus attracting increasing attention. In December 1992, the Japan Federation of
Bar Associations and the Organizing Committee of the International Public Hearing
organized an international public hearing of the victims former comfort women from
various countries and an international seminar attended by five international lay experts
in Tokyo.67 With an actual investigation in place, it was not long before hard evidence
against the Japanese government began to emerge. On January 11, 1992, Japanese
historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi discovered official war documents at the Library of the
National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, which revealed the Japanese
government’s involvement in the establishing and operating of comfort stations. As a
67
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result, the Japanese government had no choice but to acknowledge its wartime
involvement and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa formally apologized to Korea on his
visit to South Korea on January 13, 1992. Not long afterward, the Korean Council for the
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (a SK non-governmental
organization) appealed to the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate the issue
of comfort women.
Following this appeal, many NGOs, such as the Violence Against Women in War
Network (VAWW-NET), debated and pressured Japan in support of the victims. When
Japan still refused to accept legal responsibility, the VAWW-NET, a women’s NGO that
originated in Japan, decided to organize a “people’s tribunal” and was accepted by
supporting organizations of six victimized countries that later became the International
Organizing Committee (IOC). The ICO brought the Women’s Tribunal into existence
after four years of organizing and mobilized activists from all over the world.
Representatives from gathered as the members of the IOC. On December 8-10, 2000, The
Women’s Tribunal assembled in Tokyo and took the testimony of the survivors, experts
and perpetrators. On December 12, 2000 the Tribunal issued its Preliminary findings with
65 comfort women present at the proceedings of the Tribunal.
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal confronted both Japan’s
wartime conduct and its failure to accept responsibility for the crimes it committed during
the war. More importantly, however, the Women’s Tribunal served as a voice of the
victims’ pains, both past and present, and to bring Japan’s crimes to the attention of the
diplomatic community. As a result, the Women’s Tribunal is unique from all the previous
peoples’ tribunals in that it focuses on a part of history that is largely ignored by most
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historians—sexual violence against women. The Tribunal was organized by grassroots
organizers from victimized countries and held in Japan, the nation that committed the
crimes in question. Finally, it accused both individuals and state in violations of
international, humanitarian and human rights laws.68
The Women’s Tribunal was a mock trial established to address the crimes
committed against comfort women. It also challenged the established historical facts and
its trivialization of crimes against women. Organizers of the Women’s Tribunal first
accomplish was the creation of the charter that would set the jurisdiction on individual
and state responsibility for the sexual slavery against Asian women. Immediately, the
Women’s Tribunal differs from the Tokyo Tribunal. The organization of the Women’s
Tribunal Charter was the result of combined efforts of various groups, both from victim
states and international organizations, and ensures an impartial judgment in the Tribunal;
unlike the Tokyo Tribunal which was solely organized and mandated by the US to ensure
American influence in Court. Next, each representative formed a prosecutor teams to
draft a country indictment and a common indictment was formed based on the country
indictments. Again, this differs from the Tokyo Tribunal in that each participating
country is given a fair share in the indictment of Japan and is equally involved in the trial.
Also, there are four legal experts who are well versed in international laws and human
rights and are not personally involved with the victim states and the victimizer. For the
first time, a fair and legitimate trial was held in place for the Asian comfort women.
Through the combined efforts of both individual and international organizations, the
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal served as the culmination of previous
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attempts to encourage public awareness on Japan’s crimes against humanity and to honor
all the victimized women with a public trial, which the world denied to them for so long.
The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal took a whole year before it
rendered its Final Judgment on December 4, 2001, in Hague of Netherland (‘home of
international law”) where it was summarized and compiled into a 200 pages long factual
findings of the Tribunal. The Judgment consists of eight parts: the Introduction and
Background, Factual Findings, the Applicable Law, the law of Individual Criminal
Responsibility, Legal Findings and Verdict, State Responsibility, Reparations, and the
Conclusions.
The Introduction and Background presents the common indictment and a quick
summary of the individual and state’s crimes against humanity while laying the
groundwork for international law to prosecute the perpetrators in the Tribunal. The
Factual Findings is a collection of testimony of victim-survivor witnesses and evidences
found from Japan and Allied countries regarding the history and establishment of comfort
system throughout Japanese colonized territories. Applicable Law considers the
principles of criminal law, international law and the crimes against humanity committed
by the Japanese to combine and establish the Common Indictment that was formed based
on the country indictments. Individual Criminal Responsibility analyzes the individuals
accused and the extent of their knowledge of comfort women as well as individual
responsibility for participation in the crimes. Legal Findings and Verdicts summaries the
charges and evidence received of the nine accused by the Common Indictment and the
verdict of the accused crimes with regard to findings. State Responsibility analyzes the
responsibility of the state in pursuant to Article 4 of the Charter to contain and address
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the crimes against humanity committed by the country; and to also take into
consideration Japan’s reliance on the Peace Treaties to avoid reparations to Asian states.
Reparation summarizes Japan’s obligation to provide compensations for its violation of
human rights and to repair the relationships between Japan and its victim through
recommendations made by the Tribunal; and a sincere apology that publically
acknowledges its crimes to the comfort women. The final part of the Judgment concludes
the Tribunal, urging Japan to recognize its responsibility and to recommend former
Allied nations and the rest of the world to aid Japan in its rehabilitation.
When the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal was established and open
to the public, the Japanese government did not respond to the invitation to participate in
the tribunal. The lack of response on Japan’s part indicates several offenses. One, it is an
obvious disregard to the effort that was put into by the organizers of the Tribunal.
Extensive networks of experts and advocates were gathered to provide legitimacy to the
Tribunal: UN legal judges on international law and human rights, prosecution teams for
each IOC member, domestic and international organizations, former Asian comfort
women, and supporters of the Tribunal. In short, Japan refuses to acknowledge the voices
of global civil society and the commitment that was put into the Women’s Tribunal.
Second, it reinforces the notion that Japan is unrepentant of their crimes against humanity
toward the comfort women. It is an insult to the victimized nations who have traveled far
to be a part of the Tribunal and a sign of Japan’s indifference to its Asian neighbors.
Third, under Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Japan’s default
signify their lack of concern of the outcome. Whether they feared that the outcome was
irrevocably against their favor or it was not a matter of great importance, Japan did not
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feel the need to defend itself from the accusations made against them. In the end, Japan’s
absence and refusal to stand trial does more damage to its reputation than good.
The Tribunal is a crucial contribution toward the evolution of international law.
Even though the Tokyo War Tribunal resulted in a failure, it laid the groundwork for the
Women’s Tribunal and developed a body of applicable laws that can be used on the
international court. The Women’s Tribunal was critical in that it succeeded in developing
several key elements to the progress of international law. First, it addressed and identifies
sexual slavery against women as crimes against humanity and set the standard for sexual
violence against women everywhere. It was the first time that gender played a sensitive
role on the international stage. Second, the Tribunal was able to implement international
laws to prosecute crimes committed by Western countries against women of Asian
countries. For the first time, colonized countries were the ones to try the industrial
powers. Third, the Women’s Tribunal was a people’s tribunal. Authority is not derived
from the state, but from the people. It showed that international law can be used by the
people to force states to submit to their will.69
Although the Japanese government failed to make an appearance at the Tribunal,
a Japanese lawyer was invited as amicas curie to defend the Japanese government.
Emperor Hirohito was tried and found to be criminally responsible for the crimes against
humanity as the Supreme Commander of the Army and the Navy. Under Article 66(3) of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), the Tribunal must
prove that Emperor Hirohito is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict
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him.70 As ruler of the country, it was his responsibility to ensure discipline from his
subordinate. On Emperor Hirohito’s defense, officials claim that he was only a
ceremonial figurehead who did not have the power to prevent war atrocities. As such,
information in regards to the comfort system was withheld from the Emperor. However,
factual findings have concluded that the Emperor was not a mere puppet, but the
puppeteer who wielded the ultimate authority throughout the war. In addition, the
Emperor failed to take preventive steps to stop the military from committing sexual
violence against Asian women. As such, Hirohito is “criminally responsible for the
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime.”71 As a superior, he is also criminally responsible for
failing to take “necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress their commission
or submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”72
Thus, the Tribunal finds Hirohito guilty of criminal negligence for crimes against
humanity committed by the military on the oppressed Asian women.73This is the first
time that the Emperor was declared guilty in favor of the people.
The Tribunal holds the government of Japan accountable for the sexual slavery
and rape of Asian women as crimes against humanity. Japan has a duty to the people to
stop and fix past crimes. Under international law, the state is responsible for the crimes it
has committed.74 Though Japan has made a public acknowledgement, the government
still continues to deny legal responsibility on the grounds that all war compensation
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issues were settled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Therefore, the People of the AsiaPacific region call upon the Tribunal to force the Japanese government to carry the
burden of their past sins and make amends for their wrongful acts.
The International Military Tribunal of the Far East laid down the groundwork for
future international laws, but the Women’s International War Crime Tribunal
revolutionalized the body of applicable laws that can be used on the international court.
In doing so, the Women’s Tribunal highlighted the women’s right movement and
changed the law for women everywhere around the world.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
The story of the comfort women will forever be one of the greatest tragedies in
history. Forgotten in the aftermath of the Second World War, their pains were never
fully understood by the world. As such, the story of the comfort women must be
remembered so that the same mistake does not repeat itself. While Japan is considered an
Asian state, Japan’s refusals to acknowledge past wrongdoing will forever drive a wedge
between Japan and Asia. The more Japan fails to understand and lean toward the US, the
more difficult it becomes for Japan and Asia to reach a future reconciliation. The
combination of increased US influence as a result of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951
and Japan’s fervent nationalistic identity served to widen the gap between Japan and
other East and Southeast Asian nations, making reconciliation over the issue of comfort
women a problem that remains unresolved to this day.
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